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Abstract
Mergers in Japan have the dubious distinction of not creating wealth for shareholders of
target firms, in sharp contrast to what occurs in much of the rest of the world. Using a
sample of 91 mergers from 1982 through 2003 we document several distinctive features
of the merger market in Japan: Mergers tend to be countercyclical and appear to be driven
chiefly by creditor concerns. In particular, where the merging firms share a common main
bank, we find that merger gains are lower. Overall, our results point to a market that is
distinctly less shareholder focused than that in the U.S., and a market where creditors play
an important, perhaps dominant, role in corporate governance.
I. Introduction
Mergers in Japan stand out in not creating wealth for the selling firm’s share-
holders. Wealth gains in the immediate window surrounding merger announce-
ments are insignificant for target firms in Japan; indeed, they are also insignificant
for bidders, whereas for much of the rest of the world target shareholders enjoy
significant valuation increases, and bidding shareholders appear to break even,
give or take.1 In this paper we analyze why Japanese mergers fail to create
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wealth for either of the merging firms, and what role creditors might play in this
process. Specifically, we examine the role played by the main bank in merger
activity in Japan, and address the possibility that main bank objectives (e.g.,
rescue-motivated mergers) are associated with the lackluster wealth effects doc-
umented for Japanese mergers. More generally, our study offers insights into the
costs imposed on shareholders of creditor-centric corporate governance models.
While the benefits of such a system have been noted extensively in the litera-
ture (partial review follows), the costs imposed on shareholders have not been
accorded the same degree of scrutiny.
Given recent turmoil in the financial sector, with its epicenter being Wall
Street firms, interest in alternative corporate governance forms is increasing. A
natural question is whether creditor-centric corporate governance norms, as op-
posed to the U.S.-style shareholder-focused governance practices, are better suited
to protect the small investor on the premise that creditors such as banks are supe-
rior monitors of management and, where they have leverage over borrowers, can
exercise this power judiciously. The Japanese main bank system is an excellent
setting in which to examine this claim. The main bank system is described else-
where in detail (see, e.g., Morck and Nakamura (1999)); its chief features are the
presence of a main bank at the center of a business group linked to its members
via cross shareholdings (so-called financial keiretsu). The main bank is often the
chief lender to group firms, and though its equity stake in group firms is generally
capped at 5%, the main bank has traditionally exercised considerable control over
group firms, particularly in times of financial difficulty.2
The notion that Japanese corporate governance caters more to creditors than
to equity holders is not new. For instance, Morck and Nakamura (1999) show
that main banks act first and foremost in the interest of creditors; when share-
holder interests are attended to, it is done as part of a larger stakeholder group
to which the main bank owes uniform allegiance. Bankers are appointed to the
boards of directors of firms with cash flow problems, not to firms with sub-par
stock price performance. Aoki (1990) and Kaplan (1994) argue that banks exer-
cise considerable influence over Japanese executives, and so long as the debtor
firms generate sufficient earnings to meet debt payments, managers are allowed
to run their firms in their own and their employees’ interests without much inter-
ference from the main bank. Aoki (2000) is more direct, arguing that main banks
essentially have veto power over a firm’s key investment decisions when the firm
encounters financial difficulties. Flath (1990) shows that Japanese banks’ lend-
ing to and shareholdings in a borrower firm are positively related and concludes
that such arrangements help overcome standard agency costs of debt. Similarly,
Prowse (1990) shows that several types of agency costs of debt financing are mit-
igated in Japan due to the practice of creditors, especially main banks, taking
on equity stakes in borrower firms. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) pro-
vide evidence consistent with an efficiency rationale for group as well as main
bank lending to distressed firms. Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994) find that firms
2See, for example, Aoki (1990) and Sheard (1989), who provide evidence that Japanese main
banks discipline poorly performing managers. Kang and Shivdasani (1996) document how main banks
appoint directors to group firms’ boards when the borrower firm experiences financial difficulty.
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affiliated with a horizontal keiretsu are more efficiently monitored by the main
bank because short-term bank loans help reduce information asymmetry between
the lender and the borrower.
Despite these advantages, banks’ monitoring role has been questioned by
Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2000). Kang and Stulz (2000) show that bank involvement
for a firm was associated with lower performance in the 1990s. Moreover, Sheard
(1989) argues that the main bank is perceived by other lenders as the residual risk
bearer in its client firm, and in case of financial distress or default, is frequently
expected to absorb a disproportionate share of losses. There appears to be little
upside in this role, in contrast to that of a standard residual risk bearer such as an
equity holder; hence, main banks may well pressure 2 client firms to merge if 1
of them is financially distressed. In fact, Morck and Nakamura (1999) conclude
that the main bank in a financial keiretsu frequently “props up” weak member
firms. Their evidence supports the “bank power hypothesis” that maintains that
corporate governance in Japan pays scant heed to residual claimant interests and
is largely motivated by protecting the contractual fixed claims of creditors.
Our sample contains 91 mergers between listed firms in the period 1982–
2003. We examine whether the main bank has a role in the economics of merger
activity in Japan, especially in cases where 1 of the merging firms is financially
weak. We argue that a main bank, holding primarily fixed contractual claims on
the borrower, is more likely to get involved in mergers when 1 of the merging
firms is in financial distress or, more generally, during economic downturns. In
the former case, when borrowers encounter financial difficulties, the main bank is
more likely to propose a rescue merger with a financially strong client as part of
its restructuring plan.
Prior research on Japanese mergers has examined the influence of the main
bank by primarily focusing on the bidder firm. This is partly driven by the nature
of mergers in Japan, where many target firms are unlisted entities. One exception
is the study by Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000) that includes exchange-
listed target firms, but their focus remains the buying firms: They find that bidders
are unlikely to overpay for targets, as they can take advantage of the information
possessed by the common main bank.
Our analysis includes listed target firms, among which many are financially
weak and likely to impair the collateral of loans held by the main bank. When
faced with a delinquent borrower, the main bank, to the extent it has the power
to do so, is motivated to look for rescue candidates in the guise of financially
sound bidders who can be coaxed into merging with the financially weak target
firms. Borrowing from Morck and Nakamura (1999), we label the influential role
of banks in Japanese corporate governance the “bank power hypothesis.” A pre-
diction of the bank power hypothesis is that the presence of a common main bank
is more likely to be associated with mergers involving a financially weak firm
with a financially strong firm. A corollary of the bank power hypothesis is that
main banks are less likely to get involved in mergers where both the target and the
bidder firms are in financial distress.
In our examination of merger-related wealth effects for shareholders, we pay
special attention to specific macroeconomic conditions, such as the phase of the
business cycle and changes in the external regulatory structure. Specifically, we
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examine the following subperiods: i) 1982–1989 (1980s), ii) 1990–1996 (early
1990s), and iii) 1997–2003 (late 1990s). The 1980s are characterized by an average
annual gross national product (GNP) growth of 5.5% and represent an era when
firms made substantial investments in capital assets and real estate. The invest-
ment was associated with significant price appreciation both in the stock market
and in real estate in the late 1980s. As is well known, the stock market bubble
burst at the end of 1989 and the real estate bubble soon thereafter. This crash
of both the stock market and real estate market marks the end of our 1st subpe-
riod. During the 2nd subperiod, the early 1990s, economic growth slowed down
considerably, with GNP growth dropping to an annual average of 1.5%. A large
number of firms faced financial difficulties, and several large banks coped with
nonperforming loans (NPLs). A problem during this period was the unwilling-
ness of banks to come to terms with the NPL crisis, perhaps in the expectation
that when the financial and real estate markets rebound, the banks’ balance sheets
would recover.
The 3rd subperiod, the late 1990s, is typified by the aggravation of the fi-
nancial difficulties and witnessed various amendments to laws related to mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) and ownership, such as the lifting of the ban on pure
holding firms. In 1997 the severity of the NPL problems of Japanese financial in-
stitutions became evident with the bankruptcies of the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank
and Yamaichi Securities Company, and the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and
Nippon Credit Bank in 1998 and 1999. Consolidated accounting and reporting
requirements of investments at market value put pressure on firms to divest their
shareholdings in other firms and banks (see, e.g., Miyajima and Fumiaki (2005)).
The unwinding of shares by firms, combined with the banking crisis in 1997, sub-
sequently resulted in banks selling their cross shareholdings in firms (see Scher
(2001), Miyajima and Fumiaki).
Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that mergers in Japan are
driven less by efficiency gains, and indeed are largely a means to protect the fixed
contractual claims of creditors. This view of a creditor-focused governance model
is consistent with the evidence and inferences in Morck and Nakamura (1999) and
calls into question the broader appeal of governance models that forsake explicit
references to shareholder welfare in favor of other stakeholder groups.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide a brief
survey of recent evidence on merger activity in Japan. In Section III we describe
our data collection process and sources. Section IV contains a description of the
asset characteristics for our sample firms. Our main results are provided in Section
V, and conclusions are in Section VI.
II. Previous Research on Mergers in Japan
In this section we review the literature on the time-series properties of merg-
ers in general, and more specifically, on the empirical evidence surrounding the
wealth effects of Japanese mergers. We start by examining why mergers tend
to take place in waves. The neoclassical view is that mergers are a response
to resource allocation questions raised in times of technological and regulatory
changes. An alternative view treats mergers as a byproduct of stock market
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overvaluations that permit bidders to expand their control via the use of overvalued
stocks as currencies in the merger market. In Section II.B we summarize the
evidence on bidder and target firm returns in Japan. This evidence essentially
shows that over short windows surrounding the merger announcements in Japan,
both bidder and target firms experience statistically and economically insignifi-
cant wealth effects.
A. Merger Waves
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a model of mergers where stock over-
valuation encourages firms to acquire assets using their own stock as currency; if
stock overvaluation and overall market peaks tend to coincide, their model pro-
vides a ready explanation for merger waves. Du Boff and Herman (1989) also
conclude in favor of a strong link between market overvaluation and merger ac-
tivity, although they do not examine the welfare implications for bidders formally,
and ascribe rent-seeking motives for promoters of mergers. More traditionally,
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue that mergers result from shocks to an indus-
try’s economic, technological, or regulatory environment, and are an efficient way
to allocate assets following such shocks. Harford (2005) adds that sufficient capi-
tal liquidity is necessary to accommodate reallocation of assets, and that liquidity
tends to be procyclical. Andrade and Stafford (2004) ascribe a dual role for merg-
ers, both expansionary in a manner similar to internal capital investments at the
firm level, and contractionary in the face of industry shocks. A negative business
cycle can cause financial difficulties for firms, resulting in corporate bankruptcies
or rescue mergers of failing firms (see Nelson (1959)).
We note that mergers can have both a positive and a negative effect on bidder
valuations. These have been examined extensively in the literature.3 Our interest
here is on studying the role of creditors in the merger process. Specifically, we
examine whether a rescue merger can be seen as an alternative to bankruptcy for 1
of the merging firms (more often the target firm; see, e.g., Weston and Mansinghka
(1971), Melicher and Rush (1974)).
B. Japanese Mergers: The Empirical Evidence
Previous research on Japanese domestic mergers shows that bidder firms en-
joy a positive stock price runup until the merger announcement date (AD), but this
effect turns negative thereafter. Similar results are found for target firms: The pre-
announcement abnormal returns for target firms are only marginally larger than
those for bidders, with postannouncement returns reversing the prior gains. This
evidence is surveyed in Figure 1.
1. Bidder Returns Surrounding Merger Announcements
Pettway and Yamada (1986) examine 16 mergers in the period from 1977
to 1984 and find positive abnormal returns preceding the AD for bidder firms.
3See among others, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Goergen
and Renneboog (2004), Roll (1986), and Malmendier and Tate (2008).
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FIGURE 1
A Survey of Wealth Effects of Merger Announcements in Japan
In Figure 1, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are based on various windows surrounding the announcement date (AD).
Both the magnitude of CARs as well as its window are provided in the figure for bidder and target firms. aSample includes
109 mergers and 36 tender offers.
The abnormal return for day [–1] is 0.60% and statistically significant at con-
ventional levels, and the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the 2-day period
[–1, 0] is 0.70%, but statistically insignificant. Ito (1989) investigates 31 mergers
between listed firms in the period from 1971 to 1987, covering the sampling
period of Pettway and Yamada. He finds that abnormal returns for bidders are
significant (+1.15%) for the 2-day window spanning [–1, 0] but display rever-
sals and turn statistically insignificant when the postannouncement measurement
window is expanded. The results for the expanded postannouncement window are
confirmed by Komoto (2002) using a sample of 88 mergers in Japan from 1980
to 1999; that paper reports a negative abnormal return of –2.1% for an 11-day
window spanning [–5, +5]. Yeh and Hoshino (2002) investigate 89 mergers in
the period 1981–1998 and find a significantly negative abnormal return for bid-
der firms of –1.01% for the event period [–1, +1]. Yeh (2007) examines both
mergers and tender offers during the period from 1981 to 1998 and finds a sig-
nificantly positive return of 1.44% for the event window [–10, +1]. However, the
3-day abnormal return centered on the AD is not significant. Kang et al. (2000)
investigate bidder returns over the period from 1977 to 1993 and report a 2-day
abnormal return of 1.17% for the window [–1, 0].
Overall, the bidder experience in Japan appears similar to that observed in
the U.S. and other countries; that is, bidders experience small wealth effects
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surrounding merger announcements ranging from marginally negative to 0. We
next turn to target firm wealth effects around merger announcements.
2. Target Firm Returns Surrounding Merger Announcements
As noted earlier, the evidence on the wealth effects for target firms is sparser,
since most studies focus on bidders and include unlisted targets. Below we sum-
marize the evidence on exchange-listed target firms. Pettway and Yamada (1986),
using a sample of 16 mergers, find a significant abnormal return of 1.57% on
day –1, and a significant negative abnormal return of –1.4% on day +1, where
day 0 is the merger AD. The resulting abnormal return for the period [–1, +1] is
–0.07% and statistically not significant. Returns over longer interval are generally
negative and statistically insignificant (e.g., the CAR over an 11-day window cen-
tered on the merger AD is –0.86%). Ito (1989) finds similar results using a sample
of 31 target firms; the merger announcement return for the event period [–1, 0]
is 1.26% but reverses and turns negative for event windows [–1, +1] and [–5, +5]
(–2.85% and –1.75%). Komoto (2002) reports a negative abnormal return of
–4.9% for target firms for an 11-day window centered on the merger AD.
The evidence on merger returns in Japan suggests the following stylized
facts: First, preannouncement returns for both bidders and target firms appear
to be positive, though small in magnitude, and certainly smaller for target firms
when compared to similar evidence in the U.S.4 Second, when the event win-
dow is expanded to include postannouncement days, the earlier price runup is
largely reversed. And finally, target returns are conspicuously smaller over all
return windows relative to their U.S. counterparts.
The involvement of banks in the merger process has received limited attention
in the literature. Kang et al. (2000) investigate bidder returns in mergers with 108
unlisted targets and 46 listed targets during the period 1973–1993. They find sig-
nificant positive abnormal returns for bidder firms affiliated with a main bank and
conclude that the main bank enhances shareholder wealth. More recent research,
although not primarily focused on the role of the main bank, presents somewhat
different results on merger motives. Arikawa and Miyajima (2007) conclude that
mergers during the period from 1991 to 2004 in Japan were largely motivated
by industry-level economic shocks. They find that target firms during this period
tended to have lower growth opportunities and higher leverage, which suggests
that mergers may have been used as a means of corporate restructuring during
this period. Arikawa and Miyajima conclude that the increase in concentration
in the financial sector has had a perverse impact on weak borrowers by increasing
their reliance on main banks, while reducing the reliance of strong borrowers on
the main bank system. Their findings point to an overall weakening of the asset
quality in the main bank system. Kruse, Park, Park, and Suzuki (2007) investigate
69 mergers of firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) during the pe-
riod from 1969 to 1999 and find that operating performance improves following
mergers, especially for cross-industry mergers. Lin, Michayluk, Oppenheimer,
and Reid (2008) examine whether bidder firms in Japan are motivated by hubris
4See among others, Langetieg (1978), Servaes (1991), and Kaplan and Weisbach (1992).
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and conclude that overconfident managers are more likely to be associated with
value-destroying mergers.
Our study specifically examines the bank power hypothesis of merger activity
in Japan. Our main prediction is that mergers between firms sharing a common
main bank are less likely to create wealth for shareholders, and that such deals are
more likely to involve merging a financially strong firm with a weak firm, with
the chief aim of protecting the main bank’s loan assets.
III. Data
We examine domestic mergers between nonfinancial firms listed on the 1st
or the 2nd section of the TSE in a 22-year period from January 1982 through
December 2003. We start by collecting information on all firms that were delisted
from TSE during this period. Next, we investigate whether the delisted firms
were involved in a merger by examining all press articles related to mergers
in the period from 1982 to 2003. The press articles are from the Nihon Keizai
Shimbun [Japan Economic Journal], Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun [Industrial Jour-
nal], Nikkei Ryutuu Shimbun [Distribution Journal], and Nikkei Kinyuu Shimbun
[Finance Journal]. If the firm was engaged in a merger, we collect the initial pub-
lic AD and the effective date (ED) of the merger from the press articles. The AD
is defined as the 1st press date of the merger announcement. We obtain account-
ing data from NEEDS (Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System) and stock
price data from FactSet.
Our final sample contains 91 mergers over the period 1982–2003.5 Figure 2
and Table 1 show the distribution of mergers over the sampling period. We pay
special attention to 3 subperiods in our sample. Nineteen mergers of our total
sample occur in the 1980s, 21 in the early 1990s, and 51 in the late 1990s. The
last period, spanning 1997–2003, accounts for more than 1/2 of our sample. We
also note a special characteristic of mergers during our sampling period: Merger
activity appears to be countercyclical to the stock market valuation as measured
by the Nikkei Index, in sharp contrast to the experience in the U.S.6
Following Kang et al. (2000), we use the publication Kigyo keiretsu Soran
for the year of the merger announcement to define a main bank as the firm’s most
important lender while also belonging to the firm’s 5 largest shareholders. Based
on this definition, we find (see Table 1) that 67% of target firms and 65% of bidder
firms have a main bank relationship. This compares with 72% of firms having a
main bank relationship across all Japanese firms listed on the 1st section of the
TSE in 1980 (Sheard (1989)). In 31% of mergers the target and bidder firms have
5We note that prior studies have included unlisted targets in the sample. Since our study aims
to examine wealth effects on both target as well as bidder firms, we focus only on listed firms. Our
analysis of bidder returns in Section V shows that these are comparable to those involving unlisted
targets documented in prior literature.
6Several researchers have noted a positive link between mergers and business cycles
(Nelson (1959)) and mergers and stock market valuation (Andrade et al. (2001), Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan (2004)) using U.S. data. A common feature of this evidence is that merger intensity ap-
pears to increase with economic expansion, and that the use of stock financing in mergers appears to
peak in line with stock market valuations.
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FIGURE 2
Merger Activity in Japan from 1981 through 2003
In Figure 2, the number of mergers is plotted on the left vertical axis, and the Nikkei Index (year-end value) is plotted on the
right vertical axis. The sample consists of 91 mergers between bidder and target firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
for which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003.
TABLE 1
Merger Characteristics by Subperiod
In Table 1, the sample consists of 91 mergers between bidder and target firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)
for which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. A main bank is defined
as a bank that is a firm’s most important lender and belongs to the firm’s largest 5 shareholders, as indicated in keiretsu
no kenkyu for the year of the announcement. Bidder main bank and Target main bank refer to buying and selling firms that
have a main bank relationship, and Common main bank refers to those cases where the buying and selling firms share
the same main bank. We define firms as being in financial distress when interest expense exceeds operating income; the
interest coverage ratio is lower than 1, in i) the last fiscal year prior to the merger, or ii) 2 of the 4 years before the merger.
Interindustry and intraindustry mergers are determined based on the listing codes on the TSE.
Merger Characteristics All 1980s 1990s Early 1990s Late 1990s
No. of mergers 91 19 72 21 51
Bidder main bank 65% 53% 68% 95% 57%
Target main bank 67% 58% 72% 76% 67%
Common main bank 31% 29% 31% 52% 22%
Same keiretsu 52% 26% 58% 62% 57%
Interindustry 19% 37% 14% 24% 10%
Bidder distressed 35% 58% 29% 33% 27%
Target distressed 51% 63% 47% 67% 39%
Both distressed 27% 47% 22% 29% 20%
a common main bank. Mergers in which the merging firms have a main bank are
concentrated in the early 1990s; in this period more than 1/2 of all mergers occur
between firms with a common main bank. In the 1980s and late 1990s, mergers
involving firms with a common main bank are 29% and 22% of all mergers in
these periods.
It appears that the frequency of mergers involving firms in the same keiretsu
more than doubles after the asset pricing bubble of the late 1980s imploded. Same
keiretsu mergers represented 26% of all mergers in the 1980s but increased to
58% of all mergers in the 1990s. Again, this is consistent with the notion that
member firms, likely at the behest of keiretsu main banks, step in to engineer
rescue mergers when economic growth stagnates.
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Based on the NEEDS industry classification we investigate whether the
mergers are within an industry (intraindustry), or whether they involve firms from
different industries (interindustry). Whereas intraindustry mergers can be thought
of as strategic and efficiency motivated, interindustry mergers are more likely
motivated by hubris. In the 1980s interindustry mergers accounted for 37% of
all mergers. This fraction declined to 24% in the early 1990s and to 10% in the
late 1990s. With the worsening economic outlook in the 1990s, the declining in-
cidence of cross-industry mergers indicates that mergers during this latter period
were driven primarily by strategic imperatives, and less so by managerial empire
building or hubris considerations.7
We define financial distress following Hoshi et al. (1990) and select firms
that experience a cash flow crisis: Firms are in financial distress when interest ex-
pense exceeds operating income, that is, when interest coverage ratio is less than
1 in the last fiscal year prior to the merger, or in 2 of the 4 years before the merger.
Mergers involving a distressed bidder are most frequent in the 1980s, accounting
for 58% of all mergers during this period. Mergers involving a financially dis-
tressed target peak in the early 1990s (67% of all mergers). Mergers involving 2
distressed firms are most frequent in the 1980s at 47%. Overall, 1/3 of the mergers
involve a distressed bidder, and in 1/2 of all merger cases a distressed target is in-
volved. The percentage of mergers involving 2 distressed firms is highest in the
1980s and lowest in the late 1990s. These statistics are consistent with the idea
that main banks, to the extent they can influence merger decisions, would benefit
less if both merging parties were financially weak.
Table 2 combines our findings on financial distress of the merging firms and
the presence of a common main bank by subperiod. We first note that across our
entire sample, 42% (27%) of all mergers involve strong (weak) bidders and tar-
gets. The remaining 31% of mergers involve 1 weak and 1 strong firm. The bank
power hypothesis makes 3 predictions here. First, the fraction of deals involving
mergers of a weak and a strong firm ought to be higher when both merging firms
share a common main bank. Second, this fraction ought to further increase when
the economic situation worsens. And finally, main bank-instigated mergers are
less likely to involve 2 weak firms.
Across the entire sampling period, we find that 40% of mergers involve
1 weak and 1 strong firm when a common main bank is involved. This fraction
declines to 27% when there is no common main bank. In the early 1990s this frac-
tion peaked at 54% for mergers involving common main banks. This is consistent
with our hypothesis that main bank interests are best served by combining a weak
borrower with a strong borrower, and that the need to do so was more pressing in
the difficult economic times of the early 1990s, spanning 1990 through 1996. In
the late 1990s we see a similar pattern as well, though we note that many of the
mergers in this period may have been driven by strategic motives.
Overall, 27% of all mergers involve weak bidders and weak targets. Tellingly,
this fraction declines to 18% of all mergers where a common main bank is
7Anecdotal evidence indicates that the trend toward strategic mergers, as opposed to cross-industry
mergers, has strengthened in the years since our sample period ends (i.e., beyond 2004). Due to data
limitations, we do not investigate whether this constitutes a trend.
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TABLE 2
Classification of Merging Firms by Financial Health
In Table 2, the sample consists of 91mergers between bidder and target firms listed on the TSE for which the announcement
date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. A main bank is defined as a bank that is a firm’s
most important lender and belongs to the firm’s largest 5 shareholders, as indicated in keiretsu no kenkyu for the year
of the announcement. We define firms as being in financial distress when interest expense exceeds operating income;
the interest coverage ratio is lower than 1, in i) the last fiscal year prior to the merger, or ii) 2 of the 4 years before the
merger. Interindustry and intraindustry mergers are determined based on the listing codes on the TSE. A strong firm is not
in financial distress; a weak firm is in financial distress.
Common No Common
All Main Bank Main Bank
Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak
Period Target Bidder Bidder Bidder Bidder Bidder Bidder
All Strong 42% 8% 43% 11% 41% 6%
Weak 23% 27% 29% 18% 21% 32%
1980s Strong 26% 11% 67% 17% 8% 8%
Weak 16% 47% 0% 17% 23% 62%
Early 1990s Strong 29% 5% 27% 9% 30% 0%
Weak 38% 29% 45% 18% 30% 40%
Late 1990s Strong 53% 8% 45% 9% 55% 8%
Weak 20% 20% 27% 18% 18% 20%
involved and increases to 32% where no common main bank is found. These
statistics are consistent with our hypothesis that banks have little to gain from a
merger of 2 weak firms.
IV. Asset Characteristics and Credit Arrangement of Bidder
and Target Firms
Table 3 describes the accounting and market characteristics of the target and
bidder firms in the sample. Target firms have a mean (median) value of book assets
equal to 152 billion yen (51 billion yen). The corresponding mean (median) value
of assets for bidders is 690 billion yen (200 billion yen). The mean size of target
firms relative to bidders was 14% in the 1980s, 28% in the early 1990s, and 42%
in the late 1990s. The increase in the size of the acquired firms is consistent with
the increased emphasis on scale-motivated mergers in the 1990s, as opposed to
the acquisition of unrelated assets in the 1980s.
Turning to the importance of the main bank, we find that main bank loans
accounted for more than 5% of the median target firm’s debt in the 1980s and
fell to 1/2 of this fraction in the 1990s. A similar decline in the fraction of debt
represented by main banks is found for bidder firms. The declining importance
of main bank loans is consistent with anecdotal evidence on the status of main
banks in Japan, and with the evidence in Arikawa and Miyajima (2007). Never-
theless, considerable variation remains in the role played by main banks across
our sample, as is evident by examining the mean ratios for main bank debt to total
debt. The mean values are considerably higher than the median values, suggesting
a right-skewed distribution where some firms are far more reliant on main bank
financing than the representative firm. The fraction of equity shares of the merging
firms held by the main bank varies between 4% and 5%. While this appears small,
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TABLE 3
Assets and Other Descriptive Statistics of Bidder and Target Firms
In Table 3, the sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target firms listed on the TSE for which the
announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Accounting data are derived from
the NEEDS Tapes. Data on shareholders of the bidder and target firms are from the publication keiretsu no kenkyu. A
main bank is defined as a bank that is a firm’s most important lender and belongs to the firm’s largest 5 shareholders, as
indicated in keiretsu no kenkyu for the year of the announcement.
Target Bidder
Variable n Mean Median n Mean Median
Panel A. Total Assets (mln yen)
All 91 151,609 51,448 91 690,302 199,709
1980s 19 141,863 15,895 19 473,691 122,176
Early 1990s 21 208,165 114,680 21 1,078,900 701,222
Late 1990s 51 131,952 55,933 51 610,989 152,572
Panel B. Total Assets Target/Total Assets Bidder
All 91 91 0.343
1980s 19 19 0.138
Early 1990s 21 21 0.278
Late 1990s 51 51 0.417
Panel C. Main Bank Loans/Debt
All 63 0.073 0.030 59 0.045 0.011
1980s 11 0.088 0.054 10 0.131 0.042
Early 1990s 16 0.047 0.028 20 0.022 0.006
Late 1990s 36 0.080 0.026 29 0.031 0.010
Panel D. Main Bank Shareholding (ownership %)
All 63 4.2 4.7 59 4.3 4.5
1980s 11 5.3 4.8 10 5.3 5.1
Early 1990s 16 4.5 4.8 20 3.8 4.0
Late 1990s 36 3.7 4.3 29 4.2 4.5
Panel E. Common Financial Institution Shareholders (ownership %)
All 69 9.8 7.8 69 10.7 10.0
1980s 15 11.6 8.9 15 12.9 13.9
Early 1990s 20 11.8 10.3 20 11.8 11.7
Late 1990s 34 7.8 7.1 34 9.0 7.8
it should be noted that banks’ ownership of corporations is capped at 5% in Japan
under ordinary circumstances as of 1987.8
Table 4 presents the return on assets (ROAs) of the bidder and target firms
for the full sample period and by subperiod. For the full sample period, we find
that the ROA for bidder and target firms declines slightly in the 3 years prior to
the merger and picks up modestly in the 3rd year of the merger. In general, we
note that target firm ROA tends to be lower than that of bidders, with the dif-
ference being largest in the early 1990s. Not surprisingly, combining a more
profitable bidder with a less profitable target firm results in a decline in ROA
following the merger. Performance in the 3-year period after the merger remains
stable.
Looking at subperiods, it appears that profitability prior to the merger is
highest in the 1980s, declines to its lowest value in the early 1990s, and rises a
little in the late 1990s. This pattern is consistent with the general decline in prof-
itability in the 1990s following the implosion of the asset bubble of the late 1980s.
8Prior to 1987, banks were allowed to have 10% ownership of companies.
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TABLE 4
Return on Assets for Bidder and Target Firms
In Table 4, the sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target firms listed on the TSE for which
the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Return on assets (ROA) is
calculated as operating profits scaled by the book value of total assets. All accounting data are retrieved from the NEEDS
Tapes. Year 0 refers to the fiscal year containing the merger. Other years are defined relative to year 0.
Year
Period Firm n –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3
All Bidder 91 Mean 0.042 0.042 0.036 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.034
Median 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.028 0.030 0.028 0.035
Target Mean 0.024 0.018 0.015
Median 0.026 0.020 0.017
1980s Bidder 19 Mean 0.065 0.073 0.055 0.039 0.042 0.036 0.034
Median 0.054 0.055 0.052 0.046 0.044 0.053 0.045
Target Mean 0.048 0.035 0.017
Median 0.049 0.030 0.013
Early 1990s Bidder 21 Mean 0.035 0.032 0.028 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.027
Median 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.024 0.030 0.023 0.027
Target Mean 0.012 0.004 –0.006
Median 0.026 0.012 0.010
Late 1990s Bidder 51 Mean 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.033 0.027 0.027 0.038
Median 0.031 0.031 0.026 0.028 0.020 0.022 0.036
Target Mean 0.020 0.018 0.024
Median 0.023 0.019 0.022
Overall, it does not appear that mergers in Japan are associated with significant
improvements in ROA.
V. Analysis of Bidder and Target Firm Returns
Abnormal returns are computed beginning 50 days prior to and ending
50 days after the merger announcement using residuals from the market model.
The market model parameters are estimated using daily data from 200 days to
50 days preceding the merger announcement using the Tokyo Stock Price Index
(TOPIX) as the market index.9 The daily abnormal return is compounded over
various time intervals to get the CAR. Table 5 gives CARs for several windows
around the merger AD.
We find that the stock price of the target firm starts to rise as early as 50 days
before the announcement. The abnormal return from day –50 to day 0 is 10.9%,
of which approximately 1/2 occurs in the 5 days preceding the announcement of
the merger (4.7% from day –5 to day 0). By the end of day +5, the gain for target
firms declines to 4.5% (cumulative gain from day –50 to day +5). By the end of
day +50,10 target shares show an average cumulative gain of 5.6%. For shorter
windows (such as [–2, +2] and [–5, +5]) the mean and median CARs for target
firms are negative and insignificant.
9We repeat the calculation of abnormal returns with raw returns as well as an alternative value-
weighted index and find materially similar results. These are not tabulated in order to conserve space.
10We looked for merger completions during the first 50 days following the announcement and
found that the earliest completion date is 56 days following the merger. Thus the statistics reported
here are not affected by target firms dropping out of the sample in the return windows.
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TABLE 5
CARs for Japanese Target and Bidder Firms in 1982–2003
In Table 5, the sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target firms listed on the TSE for which the AD
of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. The AD is the 1st date of the merger announcement in
the Japanese business press. The press articles from the Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Japan Economic Journal], Nikkei Sangyo
Shimbun [Industrial Journal], Nikkei Ryutuu Shimbun [Distribution Journal], and Nikkei Kinyuu Shimbun [Finance Journal]
are investigated. In parentheses below the mean and median, the p-values for, respectively, the t-tests and sign-rank tests
are reported.
Target CAR Bidder CAR
Interval Mean Median Mean Median
[–50, 0] 0.109 0.098 0.039 0.014
(0.000) (0.001) (0.034) (0.098)
[–5, 0] 0.047 0.031 0.018 0.016
(0.000) (0.001) (0.023) (0.044)
[–2, 0] 0.024 0.008 0.011 0.006
(0.031) (0.036) (0.074) (0.058)
[–1, 0] 0.014 0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.145) (0.115) (0.515) (0.554)
[–1, +1] –0.010 0.000 –0.012 –0.012
(0.466) (0.446) (0.110) (0.087)
[0, +2] –0.037 –0.041 –0.013 –0.011
(0.039) (0.010) (0.084) (0.033)
[0, +5] –0.064 –0.066 –0.020 –0.022
(0.003) (0.001) (0.031) (0.020)
[0, +50] –0.046 –0.031 –0.017 –0.019
(0.063) (0.058) (0.315) (0.194)
[–2, +2] –0.020 –0.007 –0.006 –0.006
(0.260) (0.153) (0.503) (0.293)
[–5, +5] –0.024 –0.034 –0.006 –0.007
(0.264) (0.286) (0.566) (0.432)
[–50, +50] 0.056 0.081 0.019 –0.009
(0.074) (0.122) (0.406) (0.786)
Bidder firms in Japan appear to enjoy positive gains in the period leading
up to the announcement of the merger. The bidder CAR from day –50 to day 0
is 3.9%. Immediately after the merger announcement, the bidder share price falls
(as was the case with the target). The cumulative return from day –50 to day +5
is 1.9% for the bidder, identical to that of the target firm during the same interval.
There appears to be no recovery in bidder share prices in the following days. The
cumulative bidder return from day +5 to day +50 is insignificant.
A puzzling result is the reversal of CARs over short windows surrounding
the merger announcement for both target as well as bidder firms. Specifically, we
find that while prices rise in the 5-, 2-, and 1-day windows prior to the merger
announcement, this price rise is largely reversed in the 5-, 2-, and 1-day intervals
following the announcement, rendering CARs over the event periods [–5, +5],
[–2, +2], and [–1, +1] statistically insignificant. Canceled mergers are very rare,
in fact nonexistent in our sample, and they cannot explain this pattern.
Next we examine how characteristics of the merging firms influence the
abnormal returns for the period [–1, +1] (Tables 6 and 7). In particular, we are in-
terested in examining whether financial leverage and shareholder affiliation affect
value creation surrounding the merger announcements. We measure bank lever-
age as the value of total loans divided by the book value of assets and find that
bidder firms with a ratio above the median have an average CAR [–1, +1] of
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–2.4% and a median CAR of –1.6%; however, these CARs are not significantly
different from those of firms with leverage below the median. In general leverage
does not appear to affect AD CARs.
TABLE 6
CARs for Bidder and Target Firms by Merging Firm Characteristics
In Table 6, the sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target firms listed on the TSE for which the
AD of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information was collected on all firms that were
delisted from TSE during the sample period. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted firms were engaged in a merger
by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period from 1982 to 2003. The initial AD (i.e., the 1st day on
which the information related to the announcement was public before the end of the trading day) is defined as the day
that the merger announcement appears in the press for the 1st time. The press articles from the Nihon Keizai Shimbun
[Japan Economic Journal], Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun [Industrial Journal], Nikkei Ryutuu Shimbun [Distribution Journal], and
Nikkei Kinyuu Shimbun [Finance Journal] are investigated. In parentheses below the mean and median, the p-values for,
respectively, the t-tests and sign-rank tests are reported.
Target Bidder
CAR [–1, +1] CAR [–1, +1]
Merger Characteristics n Mean Median t-Test Wilcoxon Mean Median t-Test Wilcoxon
All 91 –0.010 0.000 –0.012 –0.012
(0.466) (0.446) (0.110) (0.087)
Total bank loan ratio 46 –0.017 0.000 0.483 –0.024 –0.016 1.606
above sample median (0.259) (0.368) (0.630) (0.035) (0.033) (0.112)
Total bank loan ratio 45 –0.003 0.000 0.373 0.000 0.000 1.353
below sample median (0.888) (0.803) (0.709) (0.998) (0.804) (0.176)
Bidder and target have 28 0.010 0.003 0.971 –0.007 0.001 0.536
common shareholder (0.691) (0.747) (0.334) (0.637) (0.542) (0.595)
Bidder and target do not 63 –0.019 –0.001 0.989 –0.014 –0.013 0.557
have common (0.255) (0.249) (0.323) (0.101) (0.077) (0.577)
shareholder
Common shareholder 16 0.006 0.009 0.534 0.010 0.012 1.359
over 20% (0.819) (0.755) (0.594) (0.481) (0.423) (0.178)
No common shareholder 75 –0.014 0.000 0.751 –0.017 –0.014 1.632
over 20% (0.397) (0.340) (0.453) (0.054) (0.021) (0.103)
Large corporate 27 0.021 0.000 1.481 –0.017 –0.022 0.404
shareholder in target or (0.241) (0.294) (0.142) (0.324) (0.047) (0.688)
bidder
No large corporate 64 –0.023 –0.001 1.499 –0.010 0.002 1.738
shareholder in target (0.200) (0.134) (0.134) (0.216) (0.549) (0.082)
or bidder
Member of same keiretsu 47 –0.026 0.000 1.196 –0.018 –0.015 0.816
(0.156) (0.296) (0.235) (0.085) (0.214) (0.417)
Not member of same 44 0.007 0.000 0.647 –0.006 –0.011 0.171
keiretsu (0.743) (0.940) (0.517) (0.604) (0.259) (0.864)
Intraindustry merger 74 0.003 0.001 2.035 –0.011 –0.011 0.308
(0.842) (0.739) (0.045) (0.204) (0.156) (0.759)
Interindustry merger 17 –0.068 –0.047 2.449 –0.017 –0.018 0.270
(0.018) (0.011) (0.014) (0.283) (0.394) (0.787)
The presence of a common shareholder in the target and bidder firms does
not have an important influence over CARs vis-a`-vis firms where there are no
common shareholders. The presence of a large corporate shareholder has a small
negative influence on the bidder’s abnormal returns; the median CAR of bidder
firms with a large corporate shareholder is significantly negative and distinguish-
able from the median for firms that do not have a large corporate shareholder
(however, the corresponding mean difference is not significant). Keiretsu affilia-
tion or common blockholders (defined as owning>20% of the firm) do not appear
to have a significant impact on CARs for target and bidder firms. Overall it does
not appear that shareholder affiliation affects merger wealth effects in our sample.
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TABLE 7
CARs for Japanese Bidder and Target Firms by Period
In Table 7, the sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target firms listed on the TSE for which the
AD of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information was collected on all firms that were
delisted from TSE during the sample period. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted firms were engaged in a merger
by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period from 1982 to 2003. The initial AD (i.e., the 1st day on
which the information related to the announcement was public before the end of the trading day) is defined as the day
that the merger announcement appears in the press for the 1st time. The press articles from the Nihon Keizai Shimbun
[Japan Economic Journal], Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun [Industrial Journal], Nikkei Ryutuu Shimbun [Distribution Journal], and
Nikkei Kinyuu Shimbun [Finance Journal] are investigated. In parentheses below the mean and median, the p-values for,
respectively, thet-tests and sign-rank tests are reported.
Target CAR [–1, +1] Bidder CAR [–1, +1]
Period n Mean Median t-Test Wilcoxon Mean Median t-Test Wilcoxon
1980s 19 –0.046 –0.004 –0.016 0.003
(0.161) (0.207) (0.266) (0.457)
Early 1990s (1990–1996) 21 –0.022 0.000 –0.031 –0.039
(0.271) (0.486) (0.000) (0.001)
Late 1990s (1997–2003) 51 0.008 0.000 –0.003 0.000
(0.682) (0.796) (0.809) (0.921)
Comparison 1980s–early 1990s 0.646 0.826 1.027 1.273
(0.522) (0.409) (0.311) (0.203)
Comparison early 1990s–late 1990s 0.909 0.830 1.468 2.416
(0.367) (0.407) (0.147) (0.016)
Comparison 1980s–late 1990s 1.426 1.347 0.604 0.806
(0.158) (0.178) (0.548) (0.421)
Finally, we examine wealth effects for unrelated (interindustry) versus scale
(intraindustry) mergers and find that CARs for unrelated mergers are significantly
negative for target firms, though not for bidder firms. The mean is negative at
–6.8% and the median at –4.7%, both statistically different from the CARs of
target firms in same-industry mergers. Bidder returns are not influenced by whether
the target is in the same industry or not.
Table 7 indicates that target firms’ CARs are not significantly different from 0
in any of the subperiods examined here. The bidder CAR has a mean of –3.1%
and median of –3.9% in the early 1990s; both are significant at the 1% level. In
the other 2 subperiods the bidder returns are not significantly different from 0.
Comparing bidder CARs from the early 1990s with those from the late 1990s, we
find that only the median values are statistically different at the 5% significance
level. We will next turn to the influence of financial distress on abnormal returns
surrounding merger announcements.
Financial Distress and Merger Returns
Table 8 presents the results of our tests that examine the influence of financial
distress on abnormal returns; we look into financial distress for the target firm, the
bidder firm, and both merging firms.
Target CAR. Table 8 shows that the financial condition of the target firm
and/or the bidder firm does not have any significant influence over the CARs of
target firms. The CAR for target firms is not significantly different from 0 whether
target firms are in financial distress or not. A similar pattern is visible in case the
bidder firm is in financial distress or both merging firms are in financial distress.
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TABLE 8
CARs for Japanese Bidder and Target Firms Categorized by Financial Distress
In Table 8, the sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target firms listed on the TSE for which the
AD of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information was collected on all firms that were
delisted from TSE during the sample period. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted firms were engaged in a merger
by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period from 1982 to 2003. The initial AD (i.e., the 1st day on
which the information related to the announcement was public before the end of the trading day) is defined as the day
that the merger announcement appears in the press for the 1st time. The press articles from the Nihon Keizai Shimbun
[Japan Economic Journal], Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun [Industrial Journal], Nikkei Ryutuu Shimbun [Distribution Journal], and
Nikkei Kinyuu Shimbun [Finance Journal] are investigated. In parentheses below the mean and median, the p-values for,
respectively, the t-tests and sign-rank tests are reported.
Target CAR [–1, +1] Bidder CAR [–1, +1]
Merging Firm Type n Mean Median t-Test Wilcoxon Mean Median t-Test Wilcoxon
Target in distress 46 –0.018 –0.001 0.593 –0.030 –0.029 2.474
(0.299) (0.296) (0.555) (0.002) (0.001) (0.015)
Target not in distress 45 –0.002 0.000 0.635 0.006 0.009 3.401
(0.934) (0.990) (0.525) (0.589) (0.245) (0.001)
Bidder in distress 32 –0.023 –0.001 0.693 –0.024 –0.025 1.206
(0.309) (0.332) (0.490) (0.033) (0.060) (0.231)
Bidder not in distress 59 –0.003 0.000 0.748 –0.005 0.000 1.425
(0.863) (0.890) (0.454) (0.583) (0.496) (0.154)
Target and bidder 25 –0.009 0.000 0.029 –0.030 –0.029 1.482
in distress (0.729) (0.809) (0.977) (0.016) (0.021) (0.142)
Target and bidder not 66 –0.010 0.000 0.049 –0.005 0.000 1.872
in distress (0.524) (0.520) (0.961) (0.569) (0.591) (0.061)
Bidder CAR. The abnormal returns of bidder firms are significantly negative
for all merger cases in which a firm in financial distress is involved. In mergers
in which the target or the bidder or both firms are in financial distress, the mean
and median CARs of bidder firms are –3.0% and –2.9%, respectively. These are
significantly lower than bidder returns where the target or bidder or both are not
in financial distress. When the bidder firm itself is in financial distress, the mean
return is –2.4% and the median is –2.5%. However, these are not statistically
different from CARs for healthy bidders (p-value of difference = 0.15).
Overall, a significant negative impact on the returns of bidder firms is found
in mergers involving a target in financial distress. To examine these results in more
detail, we condition the results on whether the target and bidder firms have a com-
mon main bank. In particular, we are interested in knowing whether a common
main bank is associated with lower AD returns for the bidder when the target or
the bidder firm is in financial distress. Results are presented in Table 9.
First we look at cases where neither the target nor the bidder firm is in
financial distress. We find that mean returns for both bidder and target firms are
significantly higher when the merging firms do not share a common main bank
relative to returns for bidder and target firms with a common main bank. Indeed,
the mean AD return for target and bidder firms is not statistically significant when
the merging firms have a common main bank. However, the median test for dif-
ferences between the 2 subsamples is not significant.
Next we examine cases where either the target firm or the bidder firm, but not
both, are in financial distress. These are cases where the bank power hypothesis
predicts that mergers will be motivated by a desire to protect the creditor’s collat-
eral, rather than any shareholder considerations. We find that the AD returns for
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TABLE 9
CARs for Japanese Bidder and Target Firms by Main Bank Involvement
In Table 9, the sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target firms listed on the TSE for which the
AD of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information was collected on all firms that were
delisted from TSE during the sample period. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted firms were engaged in a merger
by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period from 1982 to 2003. The initial AD (i.e., the 1st day on
which the information related to the announcement was public before the end of the trading day) is defined as the day
that the merger announcement appears in the press for the 1st time. The press articles from the Nihon Keizai Shimbun
[Japan Economic Journal], Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun [Industrial Journal], Nikkei Ryutuu Shimbun [Distribution Journal], and
Nikkei Kinyuu Shimbun [Finance Journal] are investigated. In parentheses below the mean and median, the p-values for,
respectively, the t-tests and sign-rank tests are reported.
Target CAR [–1, +1] Bidder CAR [–1, +1]
Merging Firm Type n Mean Median t-Test Wilcoxon Mean Median t-Test Wilcoxon
Panel A. Target and Bidder Not in Distress
Common main bank 12 –0.068 –0.041 2.311 –0.028 –0.003 2.089
(0.219) (0.774) (0.027) (0.329) (1.000) (0.044)
No common main bank 26 0.048 0.024 1.727 0.025 0.009 1.539
(0.060) (0.308) (0.084) (0.045) (0.093) (0.124)
Panel B. Target or Bidder in Distress
Common main bank 11 –0.074 –0.082 1.606 –0.059 –0.066 2.343
(0.018) (0.344) (0.121) (0.005) (0.065) (0.027)
No common main bank 17 –0.017 0.000 1.460 0.000 –0.013 1.999
(0.452) (0.791) (0.144) (0.997) (1.000) (0.046)
Panel C. Target and Bidder in Distress
Common main bank 5 –0.058 0.000 0.887 –0.046 –0.029 0.683
(0.456) (1.000) (0.384) (0.283) (0.375) (0.501)
No common main bank 20 0.003 –0.001 0.340 –0.026 –0.026 0.272
(0.932) (1.000) (0.734) (0.038) (0.115) (0.786)
both target and bidder firms is significantly negative (–7.4% for targets, and –5.9%
for bidders) when they share a common main bank, and statistically insignificant
when they do not. The difference in bidders’ abnormal returns for the 2 cases,
common main bank versus no common main bank, is statistically significant for
both the mean and the median difference tests. When we examine abnormal re-
turns for cases where both the bidder and the target firms are in financial distress,
we do not find any significant results. Recall that in these cases, the main bank
has little to gain from the merger.
In Table 10 we repeat the above tests using ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions. The regressions take the following form:
ADRETi = a + b · COMMON MBi + c · ROAi + ei,(1)
where ADRET is the announcement return spanning days [–1, +1], COMMON
MB is a dummy variable = 1 when the target and bidder firms share a common
main bank, and ROA is the premerger return on assets (the ratio of operating
income to book assets) measured as of the last fiscal year-end value prior to
the merger announcement. The regression is estimated separately for the target
firms, the bidder firms, and for both firms combined (by adding the announce-
ment returns and operating income for both firms).
Our main results in Table 10 confirm our earlier univariate comparisons.
That is, we find that announcement returns for bidder as well as target firms are
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TABLE 10
Announcement Return Regressions
Table 10 reports the OLS regression coefficients where the dependent variable is the AD return for bidder and target firms,
as well as the sum of the target and bidder returns. The sample consists of 91mergers between Japanese bidder and target
firms listed on the TSE for which the AD of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information was
collected on all firms that were delisted from TSE during the sample period. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted
firms were engaged in a merger by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period from 1982 to 2003. The
AD is defined as the day that the merger announcement appears in the Japanese business press for the 1st time. p-values
based on standard t-tests are reported below the coefficients in parentheses.
Explanatory Variables All 1980s 1990s
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Total Return
Intercept –0.034 –0.111 0.030
(0.880) (0.030) (0.230)
Common main bank –0.132 –0.008 –0.174
(0.000) (0.920) (0.000)
Premerger ROA 0.425 0.716 0.239
(0.040) (0.070) (0.320)
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.108 0.206
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Bidder Return
Intercept –0.006 –0.055 0.003
(0.600) (0.020) (0.780)
Common main bank –0.046 0.056 –0.074
(0.000) (0.040) (0.000)
Premerger ROA 0.222 0.371 0.263
(0.280) (0.200) (0.320)
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.205 0.199
Panel C. Dependent Variable: Target Return
Intercept 0.012 –0.036 0.031
(0.460) (0.350) (0.090)
Common main bank –0.085 –0.072 –0.104
(0.000) (0.350) (0.000)
Premerger ROA 0.262 0.738 –0.004
(0.190) (0.090) (0.980)
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.062 0.114
inversely related to the common main bank dummy.11 This result is driven mainly
by observations from the 1990s. Indeed, in the 1980s a common main bank has
a positive influence on bidder announcement returns, though the total and target
returns are insignificant. However, in the 1990s both bidder and target firm returns
are significantly negative when the firms share a common main bank. We also find
that past profitability is positively related to announcement returns for both bidder
as well as target firms, implying that mergers involving poorly performing firms
are not rewarded by equity markets.
Interestingly, in nontabulated results we also find that mergers involving
cross-industry targets yield significantly negative mean returns of –8.9% and me-
dian returns of –6.5%. The CAR in intraindustry mergers is not significantly dif-
ferent from 0, but the returns are statistically distinguishable from cross-industry
mergers at the 5% level. Overall, these results, coupled with the significantly
11We note that inferring causality here is tricky. Instead of common main banks “causing” poor
returns, it may be possible that poor quality firms rely more on main banks.
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positive abnormal returns noted earlier, suggest the importance of creditor
influence in orchestrating mergers to protect fixed claimants.
VI. Conclusions
The market for corporate control in Japan behaves very different from that
in the U.S. Using a sample of 91 mergers in the period 1982–2003, we docu-
ment several distinctive features of this market in Japan. First we show that in
stark contrast to the procyclical U.S. merger waves, mergers in Japan tend to be
countercyclical, both with respect to the general economy as well as with respect
to stock market valuations. Second, and again in contrast to the U.S. experience,
we find that a significant fraction of Japanese bidder and target firms involve a
common main bank. In such cases, a striking pattern emerges. When the bidder
and target firms share a common main bank, mergers do not appear to create
wealth for shareholders. Such mergers are also more likely to involve a weak and
a financially strong merging partner, indicating that the main bank is primarily
motivated to protect its own interests as creditor. Such mergers, as well as the
negative AD wealth effects for target and bidder shareholders, are concentrated
in the post-bubble era, that is, in the 1990s, when the broader Japanese economy
slowed down for an extended period and main banks struggled with NPLs on their
balance sheets.
Other distinctive features of Japanese mergers are the positive preannounce-
ment returns accruing to both bidder and target firms, with bidders capturing ap-
proximately 1/2 the gains that accrue to target firms, and the postannouncement
period reversal of such gains. Overall, our results point to a market for corporate
control that is distinctly less shareholder focused than that in the U.S. and where
creditors play an important, perhaps dominant, role in corporate governance. Our
study points to a cautionary approach in evaluating corporate governance models
that rely on enhancing the welfare of creditors and other stakeholders in the belief
that eventually such an approach will benefit shareholders.
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